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This paper explores how the occurrence of local 
indeterminacy and endogenous business cycles relates to dynamic 
inefficiency, as defined by Malinvaud (1953), Phelps (1965) and 
Cass (1972). We follow Reichlin (1986) and Grandmont (1993) by 
considering a two-period OLG model of capital accumulation with 
labor-leisure choice into the first-period of agents’ life and 
consumption in both periods (see also the studies of related models 
by, among the others,  Woodford, 1984, Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis, 
1986,  Benhabib and Laroque, 1988, d’Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira and Gérard-
Varet, 1995, Lloyd-Braga, 1995, de Vilder, 1996,  Cazzavillan and Pintus, 2004, Nourry 
and Venditti, 2006). We show that local indeterminacy and Hopf 
bifurcations are necessarily associated with a capital-labor ratio 
that is, at steady state, larger than the Golden Rule level. 
Consequently, paths converging asymptotically towards the steady 
state are shown to be dynamically inefficient, as there always exists 
another trajectory that starts with the same initial conditions and 
produces more aggregate consumption at all future dates. More 
surprisingly, however, our main result shows that stable orbits, 
generated around a dynamically inefficient steady state through a 
supercritical Hopf bifurcation, may in contrast be dynamically 
efficient. Therefore an inefficient stationary solution may coexist 
with an efficient invariant closed curve that surrounds it. 
The interest of exploring such a topic has been dictated by 
the evidence that the large  literature on indeterminacy in growth 
models has paid little attention to the Pareto-optimality properties 
of the allocations associated with the existence of a continuum of 
                                                      
1 This paper has been written for the conference in honor of Jean-Michel Grandmont, held 
in Lisbon on october 30-31, 2005. This is our modest contribution both to celebrate Jean-
Michel’s scientific achievements and to thank him for his impulse on our personal and 
professional lives. We thank participants, especially Subir Chattopadhyay, Jean-Michel 
Grandmont, Cars Hommes, Guy Laroque, Kazuo Nishimura, as well as a referee for helpful 
comments on the first version of this paper. We finally thank David de la Croix and the late 
Philippe Michel for discussions on the OLG model.   3 
intertemporal equilibria all converging to the stationary solution 
(see, however, Chattopadhyay and Gottardi, 1999, Montrucchio, 2004, Pietra, 2004, 
among many others, for studies of optimality in pure exchange economies). Since 
dynamic efficiency is a necessary condition for Pareto-optimality, 
we found important to explore how such an issue relates to 
indeterminate equilibria.  
By studying a broad class of OLG economies, we could prove 
that the conclusions of Reichlin’s (1986) section 3 and appendix are 
questionable, as the steady state, even close to the Leontief case, 
turns out to be always dynamically inefficient, hence not Pareto-
optimal. Such a result has remarkable implications as it implies that 
stabilization policies conducted by the governments in order to 
eliminate endogenous fluctuations, such as those considered by 
Reichlin’s (1986) section 3, may lead to a dynamically inefficient 
steady state. Therefore, such policies do not avoid the welfare loss 
associated with dynamic inefficiency. On the other hand, our results 
suggest that simple policies that aim at restoring dynamic 
efficiency, through public debt or pensions for instance, may also 
be powerful enough to rule out indeterminacy and endogenous 
business cycles. We also qualify the often stated view that no 
general connection between indeterminacy and efficiency should be 
expected (e.g. Woodford, 1984, p.28). 
Our analysis is fairly general so that the direct approach 
provided by Cass (1972) and generalized by Benveniste (1976), 
based on the consideration of the technological side only,  can be 
extended to frameworks that take into consideration also the 
consumption side (i.e. preferences). An early paper by Cass and 
Yaari (1966) is a previous study along these lines, in a model with 
neither labor nor capital. In this paper, we build upon previous 
results by Pintus (1997, Props. 2.2.4 and 2.2.7) proving that the 
indeterminate steady state is dynamically inefficient. More 
recently, Lloyd-Braga et al. (2004) have considered an OLG 
framework and showed that local indeterminacy occurs also when 
the steady state is dynamically efficient. However, the latter result 
relies on externalities that are driven by labor only, in which case   4 
the definition  of Golden Rule turns out to be unaltered by the 
presence of external effects (in contrast with the nontrivial case of 
capital externalities studied by Cazzavillan, 2001, and Cazzavillan 
and Pintus, 2004). Notice though that none of these researches 
establish, as we do in the present paper, that an inefficient steady 
state may be surrounded by efficient stable orbits. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
model and derives the two dimensional dynamical system that 
generates competitive intertemporal equilibria with perfect 
foresight. Section 3 establishes the link that exists between a 
locally indeterminate normalized steady state and Hopf bifurcations 
and dynamic inefficiency. In Section 4  we provide a simple 
example that enables to illustrate the general results stated in 
Section 3. Section 5 gathers the concluding remarks. 
 
2. THE MODEL 
 
  We consider a competitive, non-monetary, overlapping 
generations model with production. The framework involves a 
unique perishable good, which can be either consumed or saved as 
investment, a large number of identical competitive firms all facing 
the same technology, and a constant population composed of 
households living two periods. Agents, who are identical within 
each generation, consume in both periods, supply labor and save 
when young. When old, their saved income is rented as physical 
capital to the firms. 
  Assuming additively separable preferences and letting A t , 
c t 1 and  zt be labor, consumption and savings (i.e. capital demand), 
respectively, of an individual of the young generation, and c t 21 +  be 
the consumption of the same individual when old, an economic 
agent born at time t ≥ 0solves the following maximization program: 
 
[] ) ( ) ( ) / ( 1 2 2 3 1 1 + + − t t t c U U B c U Max A  
   5 
subject to the constraints 
      cz tt t t 1 += Ω A                                                                (1) 
cR z tt t 21 1 ++ =                                                                    (2)                    
, 0 , 0 , , 0 1 2 1 ≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ + t t t c c A A  for all t ≥ 0, 
 
where Ωt > 0 and  Rt+ > 1 0 represent the real wage at time t and the 
gross interest rate at time t +1, whereas  0 > B  and  A are a scaling 
parameter (which will be set appropriately so as to normalize the 
steady state under study; see next section) and the maximum 
available amount of labor, respectively. 
  On the preferences introduced in the above maximization 
problem, we shall make the following assumptions. 
 
Assumption 2.1. The functions UcBUc 12 (/ ) , ( ) and  U3() A are defined and 
continuous on the set ℜ+. Moreover, they are C
r , for r large enough, on the set ℜ++, 
with  UcB 1 0
'(/ ) > ,  Uc 2 0
' () > ,  U3 0
' () A > ,  UcB 1 0
''(/ ) < ,  Uc 2 0
''() , <  
U3 0
''() A > ,  Lim U AA A → =+ ∞ 3
' () ,  where  A >1, and  Lim U A A → = 03 0
' () .  In 
addition,  01 11 1 <≡ − < RcB cBU cB UcB (/ ) (/ ) (/ ) / (/ )
'' ' , 
01 22 2 <≡ − < Rc c Uc Uc () () / ()




3 3 > ≡ A A A A U U R  
 
The conditions 01 1 < < RcB (/ ) and  01 2 < < Rc ()  in 
Assumption 2.1 ensure that consumption in both periods and leisure 
are gross substitute, and that the saving function is increasing in 
the gross interest rate R. 
When the solution of the households maximization problem is 
interior, the first order conditions are: 
                             






1 + + = Ω = t t t t t R c U U B B c U A                                   (3) 
 
Since the function UcB 1
'(/ ) is strictly decreasing, hence 
invertible, and U3
' () A  is onto ℜ+ in view of Assumption 2.1, the   6 
first equality in Eqs. (3) can be used to obtain the expression for 
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where  uc c Uc tt t 22 1 2 122 1 () ()
'
++ + ≡  is strictly increasing in view of 
Assumption 2.1. 
  Output, denoted by  y, is produced using capital k and labor 
A. We shall assume that the technology is given by the aggregate 
production function  yA F k = (,) A , where  A > 0 is a productivity 
scaling factor. The production function satisfies the following 
properties. 
 
Assumption 2.2.  Fk (,) A  is defined, continuous, strictly concave on 
the set ℜ+
2 , and homogeneous of degree one, i.e. 
Fk fa (,) () , AA ≡ with  ak ≡ /. A  Moreover,  fa
'() > 0 and  fa
''() < 0, 
for all a > 0. It follows that the functions ρ() ()
' af a ≡> 0 and 
ω() () ()
' af a a f a ≡− > 0  are, respectively, decreasing and 
increasing.    7 
 
Each firm, which behaves competitively, seeks to maximize 
profits taking factor prices as given. Letting 01 ≤ ≤ δ  and 
0 1> − + = δ R q  be the (constant) per-period depreciation rate and 
the rental on capital stock respectively, equilibrium factor prices 
are given by 
 
) ( ) ( a a A Ω ≡ = Ω ω ,         ). ( 1 ) ( a R a A R ≡ − + = δ ρ                 (7)  
 
Eqs. (5), (6) and (7) can be combined to derive a two-
dimensional dynamical system described below in Eqs. (8) and (9) 
which generates the intertemporal equilibria with perfect foresight 
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u k a R                              (9) 
 
3. LOCAL INDETERMINACY, HOPF BIFURCATIONS AND 
DYNAMIC INEFFICIENCY 
 
The dynamical system  (8)-(9) has an interior steady-state 
(not necessarily unique) if  the following holds. 
 
PROPOSITION 3.1. Under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2,  0 ) , (
* * > k a  is 
a steady-state of the dynamical system (8)-(9) if and only if:  
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where  ) ( /
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ω
δ ρ   
Proof. See Appendix A.  
 
  To characterize the local dynamics generated by the 
dynamical system (8) and (9), one may focus on the determinant and 
the trace of the linear map associated with the Jacobian matrix 
evaluated at steady-state  0 ) , (
* * > k a  whose existence, according to 
Proposition 3.1, will be assumed throughout the section. Let εΩ  
and εR be the elasticities of the functions Ω() a  and R a ()  evaluated 
at the steady-state  0 ) , (
* * > k a . In addition, let 
1 / ) ( / ) (
* * * * * > = Ω ≡ a a A a a ω θ  (c.d. Proposition 3.1 above), 
RR c B 11 1 ≡ (/ ) ,
**   RR c 22 2 ≡ () ,
*  and  ) (
*
3 3 A R R ≡ . Then, the 






















θ                                         (10) 
and 
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2                                             (12) 
                                                      
2 One can easily check that  ) ( ' ) ( ' a aq a − = Ω  and, therefore, that  ) ( ) ( ) ( / ) ( a a a f a a Ω = ε σ ρ  
and  | ) ( | ) ( ) ( / ) ( a a a f a q ε σ ω = , where the elasticity of input substitution is   9 
 
with  . 1 )) 1 ))( ( 1 ( ) ( ) ( /( ) ( ) ( ) ( / ) ( ) ( 0 ≤ − − + = ≡ < δ θ θ µ a s a a s a a s a R a q a  
 
 
  The local dynamic analysis of the model has already been 
done in Cazzavillan and Pintus (2004). Therefore we shall refer the 
reader to that paper for details. To help interpretation, it is useful 
to relate the parameter  1 ≥ θ  to the consumption-to-wage ratio: Eq 
(1) shows that  θ θ / ) 1 ( ) /( 1 − = ΩA c  (alternatively,  θ / 1 ) /( = ΩA k  is the 
ratio of savings over wage income). In particular, one can recover 
the results by Reichlin (1986), when 1 = δ , and by Grandmont 
(1993) when restricting to the case  1 = θ  (no consumption in the 
first period of life) and  0 = σ (Leontief technology). It is perhaps 
worthwhile to remind, from Cazzavillan and Pintus (2004), that the 
steady state is locally indeterminate when the propensity to 
consume out of the wage income is small, that is, when θ  is close 
enough to one (and also when the share of capital in total income is 
sufficiently low, the elasticity of labor supply with respect to real 
wage is large enough, the first-period utility is close to logarithmic, 
the second-period utility is close to linear, and the elasticity of 
input substitution is small). All these features are obviously related 
to the conditions leading to local indeterminacy in the model 
studied by Reichlin (1986) and Grandmont (1993), that can be 
considered as a limit case of our setting involving consumption in 
both periods.  
  For the purpose of the present investigation it is important to 
stess that there are dynamic regimes in which the stationary 
solution  0 ) , (
* * > k a  is a sink and then undergoes a Hopf bifurcation 
as the selected bifurcation parameter (say φ ) is increased while 
                                                                                                                                       
0 )) ( ) ( ( ) (
1 ≥ − =
−
Ω a a a q ε ε σ  with  ) (a Ω ε  and  ) (a q ε representing the elasticities of the 
real wage  ) (a Ω  and of the rental on capital  δ + − = 1 ) ( ) ( a R a q . In addition, one also gets 
. 1 )) 1 ))( ( 1 ( ) ( ) ( /( ) ( ) ( ) ( / ) ( ) ( 0 ≤ − − + = ≡ < δ θ θ µ a s a a s a a s a R a q a  Rearranging these 
expressions yields  the elasticities in (12).   10
keeping all the others fixed (c.d. Cazzavillan and Pintus pp. 466-
68). On the basis of such a knowledge, we can relate the existence 
of both a locally indeterminate steady state and  periodic or 
quasiperiodic orbits to dynamic inefficiency. The next proposition 
establishes a first general result. 
  Following Phelps (1965), we first define the Golden Rule 
level of the capital-labor ratio. 
 
Definition 3.1. Under the assumptions of Proposition 3.1, there exists a unique 
capital-labor ratio such that  δ = ) (
* ' *
GR a f A , provided that 
) ( ) (
' *
0
' * a f A Lim a f A Lim a a → +∞ → < <δ .  T h e  l e v e l  
*
GR a  is the 




GR a  characterizes productive efficiency. By the 
assumption of market clearing, one has that stationary aggregate 
consumption equals net production, that is, 
* * * * * *
2
*
1 ) / ( k k f A c c δ − = + A A . Production efficiency is then 
characterized by δ = ) (
* ' *
GR a f A , which defines the Golden Rule 
steady state capital-labor ratio
*
GR a , under the assumptions of 
Definition 3.1.  
 
PROPOSITION 3.2. Under the assumptions of Definition 3.1, local 
indeterminacy and Hopf bifurcation of the steady state  0 ) , (
* * > k a   
imply 
* *
GR a a > , or equivalently  δ < ) (
* ' * a f A , that is, the stationary 
capital-labor ratio is larger than the Golden Rule level. 
 
Proof. See Appendix B. 
 
  The statement in the above proposition is in contrast with 
Reichlin’s (1986) appendix and arguably casts some doubt on the 
desirability of stabilization policies pushing the economy towards 
the steady state, as defined in his section 3. However, the result is   11
in agreement with the intuition that both local indeterminacy and 
Hopf bifurcations rely on high savings rates (that is, on large 
values of  θ / 1 ). When, on the contrary, the savings rate is low, 
agents arbitrage away expectation-driven business cycles. For sake 
of brevity, we mention here, without formal proof, the fact that a 
dynamically efficient steady state is always a saddle point in the 
class of models under study. 
  We next define, after Phelps (1965) and Diamond (1965), the 
Golden Age. 
 
Definition 3.2. Under the assumptions of Definition 3.1, there exists a unique 
stationary allocation, defined as the Golden Age, with 
* *








2 GR c c = , 
* *
GR A A = , and 










1 GR GR GR GR c U a U B B c U = Ω = A  
 
It is straightforward to show that the Golden Age characterizes 
steady state Pareto-optimality, which also implies that the Golden 
Rule level is achieved. 
Our task now is to examine the dynamic (in)efficiency of orbits 
around the normalized steady state by looking at the paths of 
capital and labor. Here adapting the direct approach advocated by 
Cass (1972) proves to be much useful. Denoting { } { } " , , 1 0 k k kt =  and 
{ } { } " A A A , , 1 0 = t , with   A / k a ≡ , a particular path solving Eqs. (8)-
(9), one has: 
 
Definition 3.2. A path of the capital stock{ }
0
t k  is said to be dynamically 
inefficient (resp. efficient) if and only if there is, given { } t A ,  some 
(resp. no) other path { }
1
t k  which provides more consumption for 
some periods and never less consumption, or equivalently 






t t t t t t k k C k k C A A + + ≥ , with strict inequality for some t, where   12
t t t t t t t k k k F A k k C ) 1 ( ) , ( ) , , ( 1
*
1 δ − + − ≡ + + A A defines total 
consumption in date t. 
 
The following lemma, adapted from Cass (1972, Props 1 and 4), 
provides a convenient necessary and sufficient condition for 
dynamic inefficiency. 
 
LEMMA 3.1. A path of the capital stock { } t k   is inefficient if and 
only if, given { } t A , there exists a sequence of capital stock 
decrements  { } { } " , , 1 0 ε ε ε = t  such that 
t t t t k t k F ε ε ε ) , (
~
1 A − ≥ +   and  0 > t ε , 
 where  k k F A k F ) 1 ( ) , ( ) , (
*
~




To save space, the proof is omitted, as it follows from adapting the 
proofs of Propositions 1 and 4 in Cass (1972). 
 
The next Proposition follows as a mere implication of 
Proposition 3.2.  
 
PROPOSITION 3.3. Let φ  be the selected bifurcation parameter. 
Then, under the assumptions of Proposition 3.1, the following 
holds. 
 
(i)  If the steady state  0 ) , (
* * > k a  is a sink (hence locally 
indeterminate), there exists a non-empty neighborhood W 
of  0 ) , (
* * > k a  such that, for all initial conditions 
W k a ∈ ) , ( 0 0 , intertemporal equilibria are dynamically 
inefficient. 
(ii)  If  the steady state  0 ) , (
* * > k a  undergoes a subcritical 
Hopf bifurcation at the  parameter value  H φ φ = , there   13
exist both a non-empty interval  ) , ( H H I φ ε φ − ≡ , for some 
0 > ε ,    and a non-empty neighborhood W of  0 ) , (
* * > k a  
contained in the interior of the unstable Hopf curve such 
that, for all  I ∈ φ  and all initial conditions  W k a ∈ ) , ( 0 0 , 
intertemporal equilibria are dynamically inefficient. 
 
Proof. See Appendix C. 
 
Case (ii) in Proposition 3.3 covers the case where the 
neighborhood  W of the steady state shrinks when the bifurcation 
parameter φ  tends, from below, to the subcritical Hopf bifurcation 
value  H φ . 
To show that allocations that are associated with cases (i)-
(ii) are not Pareto-optimal is straightforward, as dynamic efficiency 
is easily proved to be a necessary condition of Pareto-optimality of 
consumption levels along the life-cycle that turns out to be 
unsatisfied here. In particular, Proposition 3.3 involves a 
neighborhood that does not intersect the “Golden rule frontier” 
*
GR a a =  (see Fig. 2 below). However, we now state some conditions 
under which endogenous cycles are  dynamically efficient and 
coexist with a dynamically inefficient steady state  0 ) , (
* * > k a . In 
addition, in the next paragraph a specific example will be provided 
to show how such a result can be generated. 
 
PROPOSITION 3.4.  Under the assumptions of Proposition 3.1, 
suppose that the steady state  0 ) , (
* * > k a  undergoes a supercritical 
Hopf bifurcation at  H φ φ = . Then one gets the following: 
 
(i)  If the Hopf curve contains periodic orbits with periodτ , 
intertemporal equilibria are dynamically efficient if and 








s R ,   14
(ii)  If the Hopf curve contains quasiperiodic orbits, 
intertemporal equilibria are dynamically efficient if and 













where  δ − + = ≡ 1 ) , ( ) , (
*
~
t t k t t k t k F A k F R A A . 
 
Proof. See Appendix D. 
 
One implication of (i)-(ii) in Proposition 3.4 is that dynamic 
efficiency obtains, when  ) , ( ε φ φ φ + ≡ ∈ H H I  with some 0 > ε , only 
if the stable Hopf curve surrounding the unstable steady state has a 
non-empty intersection with the Golden Rule frontier 
*
GR a a =  (see 
Fig. 3 below), as we now see in an example.                                                         
 
4. AN EXAMPLE 
 
For illustrative purpose we now present a simple example 
which will allow to appreciate the qualitative behavior of the local 
dynamics as well as the intuition that rely upon the link between 
indeterminacy and dynamic inefficiency. To the non-specialized 
reader it is worthwile to recall how a simple way to analyze the 
local stability of the steady-state  0 ) , (
* * > k a  is to study the 
variation of the trace T and the determinant D in the (T, D) plane 
when some parameters of interest are made to vary continuously 
(see Grandmont and Laroque, 1993, Azariadis, 1993, Grandmont, 
Pintus and de Vilder, 1998). There is a local eigenvalue equal to + 
1 when 10 −+ = T D , which is represented by the line (AC) in Fig. 
1. On the other hand, one eigenvalue is equal to - 1 when 
10 ++ = T D , i.e. when (T, D) lies on the line (AB). Finally, the two 
eigenvalues are complex conjugate of modulus 1, when (T,  D) 
belongs to the segment [BC] of equation  . 2 | | , 1 ≤ = T D  Since both 
characteristic roots are equal to zero when T D = = 0, then, by 
continuity, they have modulus less than one if and only if (T, D)   15
belongs to the interior of the triangle ABC (see Fig. 1) defined by 
. 1 | | |, 1 | | | < + < D D T  In this case the steady-state is asymptotically 
stable in the forward perfect foresight dynamics, i.e. locally 
indeterminate given that the unique predeterminate variable is k . 
When  ||| | TD > + 1 , instead, the stationary state is a saddle-point, 
hence  locally determinate. Finally, in the complementary region 
||| | , || , TD D <+ > 11  the steady-state is a source, hence locally 
determinate. 
 
Insert Fig. 1 here 
  
Furthermore, the diagram reported in Fig. 1 is also useful to 
study local bifurcations. When the point (T, D) crosses the interior 
of the segment [BC], one generically expects a Hopf bifurcation, 
i.e. a change of stability in which the eigenvalues are complex 
conjugate and cross the unit circle in the complex plane. If, instead, 
the point crosses the line (AB), one eigenvalue goes through - 1. In 
that case, a flip bifurcation is expected, generically, to occur. 
Finally, when the point crosses the line (AC), one eigenvalue goes 
through + 1. In such a case, one generally expects an exchange of 
stability between  0 ) , (
* * > k a  and another (respectively two) steady-
state(s) through a transcritical bifurcation (respectively a pitchfork 
bifurcation). 
One can then easily look at local stability and bifurcations 
simply by locating the half-line ∆  in the (, ) T D  plane when a 
parameter varies while all the others are kept fixed.  
In the present context we simplify matters by assuming that 
0 2 = =σ R  and by holding fixed all parameters with the exception 
of  3 R  which is free to increase from 0 to  ∞ + . In that case, 
according to Eqs. (10)-(12), the expressions of the determinant and 
the trace are:  
   16
0 ) 1 (
) 1 (



























with  )). 1 )( 1 ( /( ) ( δ θ θ µ − − + = s s s  The ∆ line is then generated when 
3 R  increases from 0 to  ∞ + . In particular, the origin of ∆ is located 
on the line (AC) at the point of 
coordinates )]) 1 ( /[ ) ( )], 1 ( /[ ( )) 0 ( ), 0 ( ( s s s s D T − − + = µ θ µ θ , whereas its 
slope is equal to  )) 1 )( 1 ( /( ) ( 1 − − θ µ θ s R s and decreases from  ∞ +  to 
) 1 /( 1 s sR −  whenθ  increases from one to  ∞ + . From direct 
inspection one can see that local indeterminacy and Hopf 
bifurcation obtain, by construction, if  1 ) 0 ( < D , that is if   
) 1 ( s s − < δ  when  1 = θ . One also sees that the slope of the half-line 
∆ is decreasing with θ   from  ∞ + , when  1 = θ , to  ) 1 /( ) ( 1 s sR −  
which is less than 1 provided that D(0) < 1. As for the origin along 
the (AC) line, it is easy to verify that it moves with θ  along a line 
1 ∆  the slope of which is  )) 1 ( /( s s − µ .The latter is less than 1 
whenever D(0) < 1, i.e.  ) 1 ( s s − <δ . 
As a result, provided that  the inequality  ) 1 ( s s − < δ  holds, 
one obtains the configuration shown in Fig. 1. Notice that, by 
continuity, as  θ  is moved from 1 to  ∞ +  , there exists a 
c θ  such 
that  ∆ goes through the point C. It follows that one obtains local 
indeterminacy and Hopf bifurcations only in the interval  ) , 1 [
c θ  . 
The corresponding bifurcation point within that interval is found by 
solving  1 ) ( 3 = R D  and yields the bifurcation value 
. 1 ) /( )) 1 ( ( 3 − − = s s R H θ µ  Consequently, being such a regime non-
empty, we can now focus on the results stated in Proposition 3.4. 
Suppose that: 
   17
,
1



















A U c c U
B c
c U  
 
where  , 1 0 1 ≤ ≤α   , 0 3 ≥ α  and  . 0 > B  In addition, let the intensive 
production function be 
 
()
ρ ρ / 1
1 ) (
− − − + = s sa A a f , with  . 1 − ≥ ρ  
 
In view of Proposition 3.1, one can set the steady state  ) , (
* * k a  at 
) 1 , 1 (  provided that 
 
[ ]
2 / 1 * ) 1 (
− − = s s A  
and 
[] . ) 1 ) 1 (( ) 1 ( 1
1 1
1
* * * α α − − − − − = A s A s B  
 
One can then get the expression of the golden rule through simply 
algebra and obtain: 
 
( ) () [] . ) 1 /(
/ 1 ) 1 /( 1 * *
ρ ρ ρ
δ s s sA aGR − − =




GR a  tends to one when  +∞ → ρ  if  δ >
* A  (a condition 
that holds when  3 / 1 = s ). It follows that 
* *
GR a a =  holds in the 
limiting Leontief case. For the specific example studied in this 
section we have checked, by using the DUNRO program elaborated 
by Sands and de Vilder, that the (locally indeterminate) normalized 
steady state undergoes a supercritical Hopf bifurcation. 
  It is then possible to give the reader a complete qualitative 
overview of what happens in a neighboorhood of the stationary 
solution and illustrate case (i) as stated in Proposition 3.4. 
 
Insert Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 here   18
 
  Figures 2 and 3 represent, in the  ) , ( k a  plane, the normalized 
steady state  ) , (
* * k aGR , a period-3 cycle, and a dashed area in which 
dynamic inefficiency prevails, i.e. the region where  δ < ) ( ' * a f A  or, 
equivalently, 
*
GR a a > . In both pictures the steady state is unstable, 
hence locally determinate, while the period-3 cycle is stable for 
some  H R R 3 3 > . Let  δ − + ≡ 1 ) ( ' *
i i a f A R  , for i = 1, 2, 3, define the 
real gross interest rate evaluated at point i. Hence one gets, as 
reported in Fig. 2, that a dynamically inefficient period-3 cycle 
obtains when  1
3 2 1 < R R R , that is when the points 2 and 3 located in 
the dynamic inefficiency region “dominate” the point 1. On the 
contrary, Fig. 3 depicts a dynamically efficient period-3 cycle 
provided that  1
3 2 1 ≥ R R R . This is again the case where the points 2 
and 3 “dominate” the point 1. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper has explored how the occurrence of local 
indeterminacy and endogenous business cycles relates to dynamic 
inefficiency, in a standard two-period OLG model of capital 
accumulation with labor-leisure choice into the first-period of 
agents’ life and consumption in both periods. We have shown that 
local indeterminacy and subcritical Hopf bifurcations are 
necessarily associated with paths converging asymptotically 
towards the steady state that are dynamically inefficient. Most 
interesting is our main result showing how stable orbits, generated 
around a dynamically inefficient steady state through a supercritical 
Hopf bifurcation, may, in contrast, be dynamically efficient. 
Therefore an inefficient stationary solution may coexist with an 
efficient invariant closed curve that surrounds it. One also expects 
that sunspots moving the economy away from an inefficient steady 
state for a sufficiently long time may not be inefficient. 
Such a result has nontrivial implications as it implies that 
stabilization policies conducted by the governments in order to   19
eliminate endogenous fluctuations, such as those considered by 
Reichlin (1986), may lead to a dynamically inefficient steady state. 
On the other hand, our results suggest that simple policies restoring 
dynamic efficiency, through public debt or pensions for instance, 
may be powerful enough to rule out indeterminacy and endogenous 
business cycles. A systematic investigation of such policies should 





A. Proof of Proposition 3.1 
 
The solution  ) , ( k a , with  0 > a  and  0 > k , is a steady-state of 
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ω
δ ρ                                            (A.2) 
 
Eq. (A.2) can be conveniently rewritten as 
 
). / ( ) ) 1 ( ) ( ( ) (
'
3 2 a k kU k a Ak u a A = − + δ ρ ω                                   (A.3) 
 
Under Assumption 2.2, both  ) (a ω  and  ) (a ρ  are finite. On the other 
hand, under Assumption 2.1, the left-hand side of Eq. (A.3) is 
increasing in A, as uc U c 22 ≡
' () is increasing when Rc 2 1 () , <  for all 
c > 0, whereas the right-hand side is constant and finite (as long as 
a k / > A ). Whenever it exists, then, there is a unique positive 
A
*which satisfies Eq. (A.3). Moreover, one easily shows that the 
first-period consumption at the steady-state  ) , ( k a  is positive if and   20
only if the so-computed  A
* is such that  ) ( /
* a a A ω > . Existence, 
therefore, requires the following boundary condition:  
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Next, we want to solve Eq. (A.1) for B, given  AA =
*. Such 
an equation can be rearranged to get: 
) / (
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From direct inspection, one sees that, as long as Rc 1 1 () < , 
for all c > 0, as postulated in Assumption 2.1, the left-hand side of 
Eq. (A.5) is decreasing in B and tends to infinity when B goes to 
zero. Therefore, by imposing the boundary condition              
                                     
), / (
) (






1 0 a k U
a A
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c cU Limc ω
ω −
< →                                  (A.6) 
 
it is possible to ensure the existence of a unique B
*> 0 which 
solves Eq. (A.5), given  AA =
*. As a result, there are unique 
constants  A
* > 0 and  B
* > 0 such that  ) , ( k a  is a stationary solution 
of the system (8)-(9) if and only if the two inequalities (A.4) and 




B. Proof of Proposition 3.2 
 
Local indeterminacy and Hopf bifurcation of the normalized steady 



















θ    21
so that  1 ≤ D  implies  Ω < ε ε θ / | | R . The latter inequality may be 
rewritten as  ) ( / )) ( 1 (
* * a s a s − ≡ < δ θ θ . Recalling that by definition 
* * * * / ) ( k a A ω θ A = , one has that 
)) ( /( ) ( )( ( / ) (
* * * * * * * * * a k a a A k a A ρ ω ρ ω θ A A = =  or 
) ( / )) ( 1 )( (
* * * ' * a s a s a f A − = θ .  Therefore, one gets that  θ θ <  is 
equivalent to  ) ( ) (
* ' * * ' *
GR a f A a f A ≡ <δ  or, more simply, 
* *
GR a a > . 
When either local indeterminacy or Hopf bifurcation of the steady 
state occurs, the stationary value of the capital-labor ratio is 




C. Proof of Proposition 3.3 
 
  We know from Proposition 3.2 that both local indeterminacy 
and Hopf bifurcation of the  steady state  0 ) , (
* * > k a   are associated 
with over-accumulation with respect to the golden rule, at the 
steady state. To show the dynamic inefficiency of paths converging 
to the steady state, we now simply prove that there exists, in the 
positive orthant of the plane, a neighborhood W  of  0 ) , (
* * > k a  
which has an empty intersection with the Golden Rule frontier 
*
GR a a = . We show that, for all initial conditions  W k a ∈ ) , ( 0 0 , 
aggregate consumption can be increased forever, starting at any 
date  0 t , by lowering the capital stock at  0 t .  
Suppose first that such a neighborhood W exists. Then for all 
W k a ∈ ) , ( 0 0 and all  0 t t ≥ , one then has  δ ε < − ) , (
* A k F A k  for some 
0 > ε , that is, over-accumulation prevails. Recalling that aggregate 
consumption equals net production minus investment, we may 
define the former quantity as:  
   22
t t t t t t t k k k F A k k C ) 1 ( ) , ( ) , , ( 1
*
1 δ − + − ≡ + + A A .                            (C1) 
 
Suppose that we reduce, at date  0 t , the capital stock  1 + t k  by ε  so 
that aggregate consumption at date  0 t  is increased by ε . Then, for 
all  0 t t > , aggregate consumption is given by : 
 
) )( 1 ( ) ( ) , ( ) , , ( 1
*
1 ε δ ε ε ε ε − − + − − − ≡ − − + + t t t t t t t k k k F A k k C A A  (C2) 
 
By concavity of production (Assumption 2.2), one has: 
) , ( ) , ( ) , ( A A A ε ε ε − − ≥ − k F k F k F k . 
Therefore, it follows that: 
 
) )( 1 ( ) ( ) , ( ) , , ( 1
*
1 ε δ ε ε ε ε − − + − − − ≡ − − + + t t t t t t t k k k F A k k C A A  
                                    




t t k t t t t k F A k k k F A A A ε δ ε δ − − + − + − ≥ +        (C3) 
                                            t t t t k k k F A ) 1 ( ) , ( 1
* δ − + − > + A , 
 
where the latter inequality follows from the fact that 
δ ε < − ) , (
* A k F A k  in the neighborhood W of the steady state. 
Consequently, aggregate consumption will be higher for all  0 t t ≥ : 
the new path produces more consumption for the young and/or for 
the old agents all the time. Notice that an alternative proof would 
rely on Lemma 3.1: we have just shown that there exists a sequence 
of  constant capital stock decrements { } { } " , ,ε ε ε = t   solving 
t t t t k t k F ε ε ε ) , (
~
1 A − ≥ + ,  
as  1 ) , (
~
< − A ε k F k  or  δ ε < − ) , (
* A k F A k  around the dynamically 
inefficient steady state. 
Our task is now to prove that such a neighborhood of the 
steady state W exists in both cases covered by the Proposition.   23
(i)  The steady state is a sink: in consequence, one can take W 
as an open ball centered at  ) , (
* * k a  with a radius 
appropriately chosen, that is, such that W has no 
intersection with the Golden Rule frontier 
*
GR a a = . 
(ii)  The steady state undergoes a subcritical Hopf bifurcation: 
we know that this may occur only at  H φ φ = . Therefore, 
for all  ) , ( H H I φ ε φ φ − ≡ ∈  with some  0 > ε , one can take 
W as an open ball centered at  ) , (
* * k a  and contained in the 
interior of the unstable Hopf curve surrounding the stable 
steady state, with a radius such that W has no intersection 
with the Golden Rule frontier 
*
GR a a = .    




D. Proof of Proposition 3.4 
 
The steady state undergoes a supercritical Hopf bifurcation: 
we know that this may occur only at  H φ φ = . A direct proof of (i) 
and (ii) follows by applying some results that are due to Cass 
(1972).  
(i)  When the Hopf orbit is periodic with period τ , we know 
from Cass (1972, p. 214) that the partial criterion 
contained in his Theorem 2 turns out to be complete. 
More precisely, periodic orbits are shown to be inefficient 








s R . 
(ii)  When the Hopf orbit is quasiperiodic, we may apply 
Theorem 3 in Cass (1972, p. 209) to show that orbits are 
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Fig.1 An example with Leontief technology. 
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Fig. 2 A dynamically inefficient period-3 cycle. 
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